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This article is about the 1982 war. For the 1770 diplomatic crisis, see Falklands Crisis (1770).

Template:Infobox military conflict The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas), also known as the Falklands Conflict, Falklands Crisis, and the Guerra del Atlántico Sur (Spanish for "South Atlantic War"), was a ten-week war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over two British overseas territories in the South Atlantic: the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. It began on Friday, 2 April 1982, when Argentina invaded and occupied the Falkland Islands (and, the following day, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) in an attempt to establish the sovereignty it had claimed over them. On 5 April, the British government dispatched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force before making an amphibious assault on the islands. The conflict lasted 74 days and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982, returning the islands to British control. In total, 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Falkland Islanders died during the hostilities.

The conflict was a major episode in the protracted confrontation over the territories' sovereignty. Argentina asserted (and maintains) that the islands are Argentine territory,[1] and the Argentine government thus characterised its military action as the reclamation of its own territory. The British government regarded the action as an invasion of a territory that had been a Crown colony since 1841. Falkland Islanders, who have inhabited the islands since the early 19th century, are predominantly descendants of British settlers, and favour British sovereignty. Neither state, however, officially declared war (both sides did declare the Islands areas a war zone and officially recognised that a state of war existed between them) and hostilities were almost exclusively limited to the territories under dispute and the area of the South Atlantic where they lie.

The conflict has had a strong effect in both countries and has been the subject of various books, articles, films, and songs. Patriotic sentiment ran high in Argentina, but the outcome prompted large protests against the ruling military government, hastening its downfall. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party government, bolstered by the successful outcome, was re-elected the following year. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect in Britain than in Argentina, where it remains a continued topic for discussion.[2]

Relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina were restored in 1989 following a meeting in Madrid, Spain, at which the two countries' governments issued a joint statement.[3] No change in either country's position regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands was made explicit. In 1994, Argentina's claim to the territories was added to its constitution.[4]

Lead-up to the conflict[]

Main article: Events leading to the Falklands War

<templatestyles src="Multiple image/styles.css" wrapper=".tmulti"></templatestyles> In the period leading up to the war—and, in particular, following the transfer of power between the military dictators General Jorge Rafael Videla and General Roberto Eduardo Viola late in March 1981—Argentina had been in the midst of a devastating economic stagnation and large-scale civil unrest against the military junta that had been governing the country since 1976.[8] In December 1981 there was a further change in the Argentine military regime bringing to office a new junta headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri (acting president), Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral Jorge Anaya. Anaya was the main architect and supporter of a military solution for the long-standing claim over the islands,[9] calculating that the United Kingdom would never respond militarily.[10]

By opting for military action, the Galtieri government hoped to mobilise the long-standing patriotic feelings of Argentines towards the islands, and thus divert public attention from the country's chronic economic problems and the regime's ongoing human rights violations.[11] Such action would also bolster its dwindling legitimacy. The newspaper La Prensa speculated in a step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the Islands, ending in direct actions late in 1982, if the UN talks were fruitless.[12]

The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of Argentine scrap metal merchants (actually infiltrated by Argentine marines) raised the Argentine flag at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Royal Navy ice patrol vessel HMS Endurance was dispatched from Stanley to South Georgia in response, subsequently leading to the invasion of South Georgia by Argentine forces on 3 April. The Argentine military junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces,[13] ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.

Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, despite repeated warnings by Royal Navy captain Nicholas Barker and others. Barker believed that Defence Secretary John Nott's 1981 review (in which Nott described plans to withdraw the Endurance, Britain's only naval presence in the South Atlantic) sent a signal to the Argentines that Britain was unwilling, and would soon be unable, to defend its territories and subjects in the Falklands.[14][15]

Argentine invasion[]

Main articles: 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, Invasion of South Georgia, Argentine air forces in the Falklands War, Argentine naval forces in the Falklands War, and Argentine ground forces in the Falklands War

The Argentine destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad landed Special Forces south of Stanley

On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings off the Falkland Islands, following the civilian occupation of South Georgia on 19 March, before the Falklands War began. The invasion was met with a nominal defence organised by the Falkland Islands' Governor Sir Rex Hunt, giving command to Major Mike Norman of the Royal Marines. The events of the invasion included the landing of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' Amphibious Commandos Group, the attack on Moody Brook barracks, the engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan and Bill Trollope at Stanley, and the final engagement and surrender at Government House.

Initial British response[]

Further information: British naval forces in the Falklands War, British ground forces in the Falklands War, and British air services in the Falklands War
File:The empire strikes back newsweek.jpg

The cover of Newsweek magazine, 19 April 1982, depicts HMS Hermes, flagship of the British Task Force. The title references the 1980 Star Wars sequel.

Word of the invasion first reached Britain from Argentine sources.[16] A Ministry of Defence operative in London had a short telex conversation with Governor Hunt's telex operator, who confirmed that Argentines were on the island and in control.[16][17] Later that day, BBC journalist Laurie Margolis spoke with an islander at Goose Green via amateur radio, who confirmed the presence of a large Argentine fleet and that Argentine forces had taken control of the island.[16][18] Operation Corporate was the codename given to the British military operations in the Falklands War. The commander of task force operations was Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse. Operations lasted from 1 April 1982 to 20 June 1982.[19] The British undertook a series of military operations as a means of recapturing the Falklands from Argentine occupation. The British government had taken action prior to the 2 April invasion. In response to events on South Georgia, the submarines HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan were ordered to sail south on 29 March, whilst the stores ship Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Fort Austin was dispatched from the Western Mediterranean to support HMS Endurance.[20] Lord Carrington had wished to send a third submarine, but the decision was deferred due to concerns about the impact on operational commitments.[20] Coincidentally, on 26 March, the submarine HMS Superb left Gibraltar and it was assumed in the press it was heading south. There has since been speculation that the effect of those reports was to panic the Argentine junta into invading the Falklands before nuclear submarines could be deployed.[20]

The following day, during a crisis meeting headed by the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, advised them that "Britain could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded". On 1 April, Leach sent orders to a Royal Navy force carrying out exercises in the Mediterranean to prepare to sail south. Following the invasion on 2 April, after an emergency meeting of the cabinet, approval was given to form a task force to retake the islands. This was backed in an emergency session of the House of Commons the next day.[21]

On 6 April, the British Government set up a War Cabinet to provide day-to-day political oversight of the campaign.[22] This was the critical instrument of crisis management for the British with its remit being to "keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic, and to report as necessary to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee". Until it was dissolved on 12 August, the War Cabinet met at least daily. Although Margaret Thatcher is described as dominating the War Cabinet, Lawrence Freedman notes in the Official History of the Falklands Campaign that she did not ignore opposition or fail to consult others. However, once a decision was reached she "did not look back".[22]

Position of third party countries[]

On the evening of 3 April, the United Kingdom's United Nations ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons put a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution, which condemned the hostilities and demanded the immediate Argentine withdrawal from the Islands, was adopted by the council the following day as United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, which passed with ten votes in support, one against (Panama) and four abstentions (China, the Soviet Union, Poland and Spain).[21][23][24] The UK received further political support from the Commonwealth of Nations and the European Economic Community. The EEC also provided economic support by imposing economic sanctions on Argentina. Argentina itself was politically backed by a majority of countries in Latin America (though not, crucially, Chile) and some members of the Non-Aligned Movement.[citation needed] On 20 May 1982, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, announced that he would make HMNZS Canterbury, a Leander-class frigate, available for use where the British thought fit to release a Royal Navy vessel for the Falklands.[25]

The war was an unexpected event in a world strained by the Cold War and the North–South divide. The response of some countries was the effort to mediate the crisis and later as the war began, the support (or criticism) based in terms of anti-colonialism, political solidarity, historical relationships or realpolitik.

The United States was concerned by the prospect of Argentina turning to the Soviet Union for support,[26] and initially tried to mediate an end to the conflict. However, when Argentina refused the U.S. peace overtures, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the United States would prohibit arms sales to Argentina and provide material support for British operations. Both Houses of the U.S. Congress passed resolutions supporting the U.S. action siding with the United Kingdom.[27]

The U.S. provided the United Kingdom with military equipment ranging from submarine detectors to the latest missiles.[28][29][30][31] President Ronald Reagan approved the Royal Navy's request to borrow the Sea Harrier-capable amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) if the British lost an aircraft carrier. The United States Navy developed a plan to help the British man the ship with American military contractors, likely retired sailors with knowledge of Iwo Jima's systems.[32] France provided dissimilar aircraft training so Harrier pilots could train against the French aircraft used by Argentina.[33] French and British intelligence also worked to prevent Argentina from obtaining more Exocet missiles on the international market,[34] while at the same time Peru attempted to purchase 12 missiles for Argentina, in a failed secret operation.[35][36] Chile gave support to Britain in the form of intelligence about the Argentine military and early warning intelligence on Argentine air movements.[37][38] Throughout the war, Argentina was afraid of a Chilean military intervention in Patagonia and kept some of her best mountain regiments away from the Falklands near the Chilean border as a precaution.[39]

While France overtly backed the United Kingdom, a French technical team remained in Argentina throughout the war. French government sources have said that the French team was engaged in intelligence-gathering; however, it simultaneously provided direct material support to the Argentines, identifying and fixing faults in Exocet missile launchers.[40] According to the book Operation Israel, advisers from Israel Aerospace Industries were already in Argentina and continued their work during the conflict. The book also claims that Israel sold weapons and drop tanks in a secret operation in Peru.[41][42] Peru also openly sent "Mirages, pilots and missiles" to Argentina during the war.[43] Peru had earlier transferred ten Hercules transport planes to Argentina soon after the British Task Force had set sail in April 1982.[44] Nick van der Bijl records that, after the Argentine defeat at Goose Green, Venezuela and Guatemala offered to send paratroops to the Falklands.[45] Through Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, Argentina received 20 launchers and 60 SA-7 missiles, as well as machine guns, mortars and mines; all in all, the load of four trips of two Boeing 707s of the AAF, refuelled in Recife with the knowledge and consent of the Brazilian government.[46] Some of these clandestine logistics operations were mounted by the Soviet Union.[47]

British Task Force[]

Main article: British logistics in the Falklands War
File:HMS Invincible (R05) underway c1981.jpg

HMS Invincible, one of two aircraft carriers that the Royal Navy had available for the task force.

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Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FRS1. The gloss paint scheme was altered to a duller one en route south.

The British government had no contingency plan for an invasion of the islands, and the task force was rapidly put together from whatever vessels were available.[48] The nuclear submarine Conqueror set sail from France on 4 April, whilst the two aircraft carriers Invincible and Hermes, in the company of escort vessels, left Portsmouth only a day later.[21] On its return to Southampton from a world cruise on 7 April, the ocean liner SS Canberra was requisitioned and set sail two days later with 3 Commando Brigade aboard.[21] The ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 2 was also requisitioned and left Southampton on 12 May with 5th Infantry Brigade on board.[21] The whole task force eventually comprised 127 ships: 43 Royal Navy vessels, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and 62 merchant ships.[48]

The retaking of the Falkland Islands was considered extremely difficult. The U.S. Navy considered a successful counter-invasion by the British "...a military impossibility."[49] Firstly, the British were significantly constrained by the disparity in deployable air cover.[50] The British had 42 aircraft (28 Sea Harriers and 14 Harrier GR.3s) available for air combat operations,[51] against approximately 122 serviceable jet fighters, of which about 50 were used as air superiority fighters and the remainder as strike aircraft, in Argentina's air forces during the war.[52] Crucially, the British lacked airborne early warning and control (AEW) aircraft. Planning also considered the Argentine surface fleet and the threat posed by Exocet-equipped vessels or the two Type 209 submarines.[53]

By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up the airbase of RAF Ascension Island, co-located with Wideawake Airfield on the mid-Atlantic British overseas territory of Ascension Island, including a sizeable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile, the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for active service. A small force had already been sent south to recapture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south.[54] Several of these flights were intercepted by Sea Harriers outside the British-imposed exclusion zone; the unarmed 707s were not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to armed force. On 23 April, a Brazilian commercial Douglas DC-10 from VARIG Airlines en route to South Africa was intercepted by British Harriers who visually identified the civilian plane.[55]

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on Santa Fe[]

The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Template:Sclass HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April.

The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in—the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack.

File:USS Catfish;0833910.jpg

The ARA Santa Fe sailing on the surface.

On 25 April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South Georgia, the submarine ARA Santa Fe was spotted on the surface[56] by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed the submarine with its pintle-mounted general purpose machine gun; the Wessex also fired on Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from diving. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With Tidespring now far out to sea, and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British troops and a naval bombardment demonstration by two Royal Navy vessels (Antrim and Plymouth), the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen." The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news, and congratulate our forces and the Marines!"[57]

Black Buck raids[]

Main article: Operation Black Buck
File:Avro Vulcan Bomber RAF.JPEG

RAF Avro Vulcan B.Mk.2 strategic bomber

On 1 May, British operations on the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack (of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley. A Vulcan bomber from Ascension flew on an 8,000-nautical-mile (15,000 km; 9,200 mi) round trip dropping conventional bombs across the runway at Stanley and back to Ascension. The mission required repeated refuelling, and required several Victor tanker aircraft operating in concert, including tanker to tanker refuelling. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, and the raids consumed precious tanker resources from Ascension,[58] but also prevented Argentina from stationing fast jets on the islands.

The raids did minimal damage to the runway, and damage to radars was quickly repaired. As of 2014 the Royal Air Force Web site still states that all the three bombing missions had been successful,[59] but historian Lawrence Freedman, who had access to classified documents, said in a 2005 book that the subsequent bombing missions were failures.[60] Argentine sources said that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw some of its Mirage IIIs from Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone.[61][62][63] This was later described as propaganda by Falklands veteran Commander Nigel Ward.[64] In any case, the effect of the Vulcan raids on Argentina's deployment of defensive fighters was watered down when British officials made clear that there would be no strikes on air bases in Argentina.[65]

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation missiles.

Escalation of the air war[]

File:Super Etendard ARA 204.jpg

French-built Super Étendard of the Argentine Naval Aviation

The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, and even that was too short to support fast jets (although an arrestor gear was fitted in April to support Skyhawks). Therefore, the Argentines were forced to launch their major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4 Skyhawks, IAI Daggers, English Electric Canberras, and Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop up profile. Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible. A Dagger[66] and a Canberra were shot down.

Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but was damaged and without enough fuel to return to its mainland air base. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.[67]

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadrón Fénix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights on June 7, an Air Force Learjet 35A was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.[68][69] Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (Franco-German Roland and British Tigercat) and Swiss-built Oerlikon 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. Lockheed Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict.

The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight[70][71] when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.

Various options to attack the home base of the five Argentine Etendards at Río Grande were examined and discounted (Operation Mikado), subsequently five Royal Navy submarines lined up, submerged, on the edge of Argentina's 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the British task force.[72]

Sinking of ARA General Belgrano[]

File:ARA Belgrano 1982.PNG

ARA Belgrano

File:ARA Alférez Sobral (A-9).jpg

Alferez Sobral

Two British naval task forces (one of surface vessels and one of submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the Second World War-vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank General Belgrano on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three members of General Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. The losses from General Belgrano totalled nearly half of the Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict and the loss of the ship hardened the stance of the Argentine government.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, due to disagreement on the exact nature of the Maritime Exclusion Zone and whether General Belgrano had been returning to port at the time of the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of the conventional submarine ARA San Luis,[56] returned to port and did not leave again during the fighting. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral, that was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force Canberra light bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy Lynx helicopters fired four Sea Skua missiles at her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, Alferez Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later. The Canberra's crew were never found.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield[]

File:HMS Sheffield (D80).jpg

HMS Sheffield

On 4 May, two days after the sinking of General Belgrano, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike from the Argentine 2nd Naval Air Fighter/Attack Squadron. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May.

The incident is described in detail by Admiral Sandy Woodward in his book One Hundred Days, Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding officer of Sheffield.[73] The destruction of Sheffield (the first Royal Navy ship sunk in action since the Second World War) had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual "shooting war".

The tempo of operations increased throughout the first half of May as the United Nations' attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the Argentinians. The final British negotiating position was presented to Argentina by UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar on 18 May 1982. In it, the British abandoned their previous "red-line" that British administration of the islands should be restored on the withdrawal of Argentinian forces, as supported by United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. Instead, it proposed a UN administrator should supervise the mutual withdrawal of both Argentinian and British forces, then govern the islands in consultation with the representative institutions of the islands, including Argentines, although no Argentines lived there. Reference to "self determination" of the islanders was dropped and the British proposed that future negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands should be conducted by the UN.[74]

British special forces operations[]

Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard-Exocet combination, plans were made to use C-130s to fly in some SAS troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The operation was codenamed "Mikado". The operation was later scrapped, after acknowledging that its chances of success were limited, and replaced with a plan to use HMS Onyx to drop SAS operatives several miles offshore at night for them to make their way to the coast aboard rubber inflatables and proceed to destroy Argentina's remaining Exocet stockpile.[75]

An SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of 17 May, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target and the mission was aborted.[76] The pilot flew to Chile, landed south of Punta Arenas, and dropped off the SAS team. The helicopter's crew of three then destroyed the aircraft, surrendered to Chilean police on 25 May, and were repatriated to the UK after interrogation. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention. Meanwhile, the SAS team crossed the border and penetrated deep into Argentina, but cancelled their mission after the Argentines suspected an SAS operation and deployed some 2,000 troops to search for them. The SAS men were able to return to Chile, and took a civilian flight back to the UK.[77]

On 14 May the SAS carried out a raid on Pebble Island on the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airstrip map for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground-attack aircraft and Beechcraft T-34 Mentors, which resulted in the destruction of several aircraft.[nb 1]

Land battles[]

Landing at San Carlos – Bomb Alley[]

Main articles: Operation Sutton and Battle of San Carlos
File:Action stations Falklands 1982.JPG

British sailors in anti-flash gear at action stations on HMS Cardiff near San Carlos, June 1982.

During the night of 21 May, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare – COMAW) mounted Operation Sutton, the amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water,[nb 2] on the northwestern coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets.[78][79]

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando Royal Marines from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3 Para) from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid was landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness was landed at Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably, the waves of eight LCUs and eight LCVPs were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who had commanded the Falklands detachment NP8901 from March 1978 to 1979. 42 Commando on the ocean liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, etc. and armoured reconnaissance vehicles were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round Table class LSL and mexeflote barges. Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Sea Kings for rapid deployment.

By dawn the next day, they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there, Brigadier Julian Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley. Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (14 June).

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HMS Antelope smoking after being hit, 23 May

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HMS Coventry

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 24 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyor (struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistical perspective.

Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as a decoy to draw away Argentine aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.[80] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped being sunk because of weaknesses of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics described below.

To avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots released ordnance from very low altitude, and hence their bomb fuzes did not have sufficient time to arm before impact. The low release of the retarded bombs (some of which the British had sold to the Argentines years earlier) meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. A simple free-fall bomb in a low altitude release, impacts almost directly below the aircraft, which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone of the explosion.

A retarded bomb has a small parachute or air brake that opens to reduce the speed of the bomb to produce a safe horizontal separation between the two. The fuze for a retarded bomb requires that the retarder be open a minimum time to ensure safe separation. The pilots would have been aware of this—but due to the high concentration required to avoid SAMs, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), and British Sea Harriers, many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The Argentine forces solved the problem by fitting improvised retarding devices, allowing the pilots to effectively employ low-level bombing attacks on 8 June.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blamed the BBC World Service for disclosing information that led the Argentines to change the retarding devices on the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from a Ministry of Defence official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen.[81] Colonel 'H'. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Para.

Thirteen bombs hit British ships without detonating.[82] Lord Craig, the retired Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better Template:Sic and we would have lost"[83] although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuzes were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude.[81] [84] The Argentines lost 22 aircraft in the attacks.[nb 3]

Battle of Goose Green[]


Infantry deployment in East Falklands after landing in San Carlos

Main article: Battle of Goose Green

From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men) with artillery support from 8 Commando Battery, Royal Artillery, approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Infantry Regiment. After a tough struggle that lasted all night and into the next day, the British won the battle; in all, 17 British and 47 Argentine soldiers were killed. In total 961 Argentine troops (including 202 Argentine Air Force personnel of the Condor airfield) were taken prisoner.

The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para, was killed at the head of his battalion while charging into the well-prepared Argentine positions. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos beachhead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started a loaded march across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet.

Special forces on Mount Kent[]

Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent.[nb 4] Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative).

For the next week, the SAS and the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally second in Command of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them, Harrier XZ963, flown by Squadron Leader Jerry Pook—in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through small-arms fire. Pook was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.[85]

The Argentine Navy used their last AM39 Exocet missile attempting to attack HMS Invincible on 30 May. There are Argentine claims that the missile struck;[86][87] however, the British have denied this, some citing that HMS Avenger shot it down.[88][89] When Invincible returned to the UK after the war, she showed no signs of missile damage.

On 31 May, the M&AWC defeated Argentine Special Forces at the skirmish at Top Malo House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain José Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed 200 metres (700 ft) from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for 45 minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender.

Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side, there were two dead, including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were posthumously decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol came down from Malo Hill, brandishing a large Union Jack. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.

601st Commando tried to move forward to rescue 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando, they were engaged with L16 81mm mortars and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. The leader of 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal.[90]

The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11:00 am on 30 May, an Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent. Six Argentine National Gendarmerie Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.[91]

As Brigadier Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood HQ that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before de-planing and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."[92]

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy[]

Main article: Bluff Cove Air Attacks

By 1 June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley. During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. Of the dead, 32 were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram on 8 June. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.[93]

The Guards were sent to support an advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered that the area was clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement on Port Fitzroy).

This uncoordinated advance caused great difficulties in planning for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30 miles (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea.

Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible, leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, after which Sir Tristram would be left to unload using a Mexeflote (a powered raft) for as long as it took to finish.

Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Commodore Clapp to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but with no suitable beaches to land on, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and her sister ship Fearless sailing half-way to dispatch their craft was devised.

The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and landed directly at Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June. Anchored 1,200 feet (370 m) apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated landing point.

The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to that point relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting that his troops should be ferried the far longer distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The alternative was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentine combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around seven miles (11 km).

On Sir Galahad's stern ramp there was an argument about what to do. The officers on board were told that they could not sail to Bluff Cove that day. They were told that they had to get their men off ship and onto the beach as soon as possible as the ships were vulnerable to enemy aircraft. It would take 20 minutes to transport the men to shore using the LCU and Mexeflote. They would then have the choice of walking the seven miles to Bluff Cove or wait until dark to sail there. The officers on board said that they would remain on board until dark and then sail. They refused to take their men off the ship. They possibly doubted that the bridge had been repaired due to the presence on board Sir Galahad of the Royal Engineer Troop whose job it was to repair the bridge. The Welsh Guards were keen to rejoin the rest of their Battalion, who were potentially facing the enemy without their support. They had also not seen any enemy aircraft since landing at San Carlos and may have been overconfident in the air defences. Ewen Southby-Tailyour gave a direct order for the men to leave the ship and go to the beach. The order was ignored.

The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops directly to Bluff Cove and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused an enormous delay in unloading. This had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence, and still almost fully laden, the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentine A-4 Skyhawks.

The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships.

File:Cardiff anchored outside Port Stanley.JPG

HMS Cardiff anchored outside Port Stanley at the end of hostilities in 1982

British casualties were 48 killed and 115 wounded.[94] Three Argentine pilots were also killed. The air strike delayed the scheduled British ground attack on Stanley by two days.[95] Argentine General Mario Menéndez, commander of Argentine forces in the Falklands, was told that 900 British soldiers had died. He expected that the losses would cause enemy morale to drop and the British assault to stall.

Fall of Stanley[]


The road to Stanley

File:Argentine prisoners of war - Port Stanley.JPG

Argentine prisoners of war – Port Stanley

On the night of 11 June, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously attacked in the Battle of Mount Harriet, Battle of Two Sisters, and Battle of Mount Longdon. Mount Harriet was taken at a cost of 2 British and 18 Argentine soldiers. At Two Sisters, the British faced both enemy resistance and friendly fire, but managed to capture their objectives. The toughest battle was at Mount Longdon. British forces were bogged down by assault rifle, mortar, machine gun, artillery fire, sniper fire, and ambushes. Despite this, the British continued their advance.

During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS Glamorgan, straying too close to shore while returning from the gun line, was struck by an improvised trailer-based Exocet MM38 launcher taken from the destroyer ARA Seguí by Argentine Navy technicians.[96] On the same day, Sergeant Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an Argentine bunker, which earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The night of 13 June saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para, with light armour support from The Blues and Royals, captured Wireless Ridge, with the loss of 3 British and 25 Argentine lives, and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, which cost 10 British and 30 Argentine lives.

File:Discarded weapons, Stanley 1982.JPG

A pile of discarded Argentine weapons in Port Stanley

With the last natural defence line at Mount Tumbledown breached, the Argentine town defences of Stanley began to falter. In the morning gloom, one company commander got lost and his junior officers became despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", but the entire company did nothing of the kind.[97]

A ceasefire was declared on 14 June and the commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Brigade General Mario Menéndez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore the same day.

See also: Argentine surrender in the Falklands War

Recapture of South Sandwich Islands[]


The Argentine Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base

On 20 June, the British retook the South Sandwich Islands (which involved accepting the surrender of the Southern Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base), and declared hostilities over. Argentina had established Corbeta Uruguay in 1976, but prior to 1982 the United Kingdom had contested the existence of the Argentine base only through diplomatic channels.



The Argentine Military Cemetery, on East Falkland


The British Military Cemetery at San Carlos on East Falkland

In total 907 were killed during the 74 days of the conflict:

  • Argentina – 649[98]
    • Ejército Argentino (Army) – 194 (16 officers, 35 non-commissioned officers (NCO) and 143 conscript privates)[99]
    • Armada de la República Argentina (Navy) – 341 (including 321 in ARA General Belgrano and 4 naval aviators)
      • IMARA (Marines) – 34[100]
    • Fuerza Aérea Argentina (Air Force) – 55 (including 31 pilots and 14 ground crew)[101]
    • Gendarmería Nacional Argentina (Border Guard) – 7
    • Prefectura Naval Argentina (Coast Guard) – 2
    • Civilian sailors – 16
  • United Kingdom – A total of 255 British servicemen and 3 female Falkland Island civilians were killed during the Falklands War.[102]
    • Royal Navy – 86 + 2 Hong Kong laundrymen (see below)[103]
    • Royal Marines – 27 (2 officers, 14 NCOs and 11 marines)[104]
    • Royal Fleet Auxiliary – 4 + 6 Hong Kong sailors[105][106]
    • Merchant Navy – 6[105]
    • British Army – 123 (7 officers, 40 NCOs and 76 privates)[107][108][109]
    • Royal Air Force – 1 (1 officer)[105]
    • Falkland Islands civilians – 3 women killed by friendly fire[105]

Of the 86 Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in HMS Ardent, 19 + 1 lost in HMS Sheffield, 19 + 1 lost in HMS Coventry and 13 lost in HMS Glamorgan. Fourteen naval cooks were among the dead, the largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.

Thirty-three of the British Army's dead came from the Welsh Guards, 21 from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18 from the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 19 from the Special Air Service, 3 from Royal Signals and 8 from each of the Scots Guards and Royal Engineers. The 1st battalion/7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles lost one man killed.

Two more British deaths may be attributed to Operation Corporate, bringing the total to 260:

  • Captain Brian Biddick from SS Uganda underwent an emergency operation on the voyage to the Falklands. Later he was repatriated by an RAF medical flight to the hospital at Wroughton where he died on 12 May.[110]
  • Paul Mills from HMS Coventry suffered from complications from a skull fracture sustained in the sinking of his ship and died on 29 March 1983; he is buried in his home town of Swavesey.[111]

There were 1,188 Argentine and 777 British non-fatal casualties.

Further information about the field hospitals and hospital ships is at Ajax Bay and List of hospitals and hospital ships of the Royal Navy. On the Argentine side beside the Military Hospital at Port Stanley, the Argentine Air Force Mobile Field Hospital was deployed at Comodoro Rivadavia.

Red Cross Box[]

Before British offensive operations began, the British and Argentine governments agreed to establish an area on the high seas where both sides could station hospital ships without fear of attack by the other side. This area, a circle 20 nautical miles in diameter, was referred to as the Red Cross Box (48°30′S 53°45′W / 48.500°S 53.750°W / -48.500; -53.750

Fatal error: The format of the coordinate could not be determined. Parsing failed.

), about 45 miles (72 km) north of Falkland Sound. Ultimately, the British stationed four ships (HMS Hydra, HMS Hecla and HMS Herald and the primary hospital ship SS Uganda) within the box, while the Argentines stationed three (ARA Almirante Irízar, Bahia Paraiso and Puerto Deseado).

File:HMS Hecla 1982 Gibraltar.jpg

Hecla at HM Naval Base Gibraltar, during conversion to a hospital ship for service during the Falklands War

The hospital ships were non-warships converted to serve as hospital ships. The three British naval vessels were survey vessels and Uganda was a passenger liner. Almirante Irizar was an icebreaker, Bahia Paraiso was an Antarctic supply transport and Puerto Deseado was a survey ship. The British and Argentine vessels operating within the Box were in radio contact and there was some transfer of patients between the hospital ships. For example, the Uganda on four occasions transferred patients to an Argentine hospital ship. The British naval hospital ships operated as casualty ferries, carrying casualties from both sides from the Falklands to Uganda and operating a shuttle service between the Red Cross Box and Montevideo.

Throughout the conflict officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted inspections to verify that all concerned were abiding by the rules of the Geneva Conventions. On 12 June, some personnel transferred from the Argentine hospital ship to the British ships by helicopter. Argentine naval officers also inspected the British casualty ferries in the estuary of the River Plate.

British casualty evacuation[]

Hydra worked with Hecla and Herald, to take casualties from Uganda to Montevideo, Uruguay, where a fleet of Uruguayan ambulances would meet them. RAF VC10 aircraft then flew the casualties to the UK for transfer to the Princess Alexandra Royal Air Force Hospital at RAF Wroughton, near Swindon.[112]


Main article: Aftermath of the Falklands War

This brief war brought many consequences for all the parties involved, besides the considerable casualty rate and large materiel loss, especially of shipping and aircraft, relative to the deployed military strengths of the opposing sides.

In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher's popularity increased. The success of the Falklands campaign was widely regarded as the factor in the turnaround in fortunes for the Conservative government, who had been trailing behind the SDP-Liberal Alliance in the opinion polls for months before the conflict began, but after the success in the Falklands the Conservatives returned to the top of the opinion polls by a wide margin and went on to win the following year's general election by a landslide.[113] Subsequently, Defence Secretary Nott's proposed cuts to the Royal Navy were abandoned.

The islanders subsequently had full British citizenship restored in 1983, their lifestyle improved by investments Britain made after the war and by the liberalisation of economic measures that had been stalled through fear of angering Argentina. In 1985, a new constitution was enacted promoting self-government, which has continued to devolve power to the islanders.

In Argentina, the Falklands War meant that a possible war with Chile was avoided. Further, Argentina returned to a democratic government in the 1983 general election, the first free general election since 1973. It also had a major social impact, destroying the military's image as the "moral reserve of the nation" that they had maintained through most of the 20th century.

Various figures have been produced for the number of veterans who have committed suicide since the war. Some studies have estimated that 264 British veterans and 350–500 Argentine veterans have committed suicide since 1982.[114][115][116] However, a detailed study[117] of 21,432 British veterans of the war commissioned by the UK Ministry of Defence found that only 95 had died from "intentional self-harm and events of undetermined intent (suicides and open verdict deaths)", a proportion lower than would be expected within the general population over the same period.[118]

Military analysis[]

Militarily, the Falklands conflict remains the largest air-naval combat operation between modern forces since the end of the Second World War. As such, it has been the subject of intense study by military analysts and historians. The most significant "lessons learned" include: the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and submarines, the challenges of co-ordinating logistical support for a long-distance projection of power, and reconfirmation of the role of tactical air power, including the use of helicopters.

In 1986, the BBC broadcast the Horizon programme, In the Wake of HMS Sheffield, which discussed lessons learned from the conflict—and measures since taken to implement them, such as stealth ships and close-in weapon systems.



The Monumento a los Caídos en Malvinas ("Monument for the Fallen in the Falklands") in Plaza San Martín, Buenos Aires; a member of the historic Patricios regiment stands guard.[nb 5]

In addition to memorials on the islands, there is a memorial in the crypt of St Paul's Cathedral, London to the British war dead.[119] The Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel at Pangbourne College was opened in March 2000 as a commemoration of the lives and sacrifice of all those who served and died in the South Atlantic in 1982.[120] In Argentina, there is a memorial at Plaza San Martín in Buenos Aires,[121] another one in Rosario, and a third one in Ushuaia.

During the war, British dead were put into plastic body bags and buried in mass graves. After the war, the bodies were recovered; 14 were reburied at Blue Beach Military Cemetery and 64 were returned to Britain.

Many of the Argentine dead are buried in the Argentine Military Cemetery west of the Darwin Settlement. The government of Argentina declined an offer by Britain to have the bodies repatriated to the mainland.[122]



Although some minefields have been cleared, a substantial number of them still exist in the islands, such as this one at Port William on East Falkland.

As of 2011, there were 113 uncleared minefields on the Falkland Islands and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) covering an area of 13 km2 (5.0 sq mi). Of this area, 5.5 km2 (2.1 sq mi) on the Murrell Peninsula were classified as being "suspected minefields"—the area had been heavily pastured for the previous 25 years without incident. It was estimated that these minefields had 20,000 anti-personnel mines and 5,000 anti-tank mines. No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falkland Islands since 1984, and no civilian mine casualties have ever occurred on the islands. The UK reported six military personnel were injured in 1982 and a further two injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.

On 9 May 2008, the Falkland Islands Government asserted that the minefields, which represent 0.1% of the available farmland on the islands "present no long term social or economic difficulties for the Falklands," and that the impact of clearing the mines would cause more problems than containing them. However, the British Government, in accordance with its commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty has a commitment to clear the mines by the end of 2019. [123][124] In May 2012, it was announced that 3.7 km2 (1.4 sq mi) of Stanley Common (which lies between the Stanley – Mount Pleasant road and the shoreline) was made safe and had been opened to the public, opening up a 3-kilometre (1.9 mi) stretch of coastline and a further two kilometres of shoreline along Mullet's Creek.[125]

Press and publicity[]



Gente's "Estamos ganando" headline ("We're winning")

Selected war correspondents were regularly flown to Port Stanley in military aircraft to report on the war. Back in Buenos Aires, newspapers and magazines faithfully reported on "the heroic actions of the largely conscript army and its successes".[12]

Officers from the intelligence services were attached to the newspapers and 'leaked' information confirming the official communiqués from the government. The glossy magazines Gente and Siete Días swelled to 60 pages with colour photographs of British warships in flames—many of them faked—and bogus eyewitness reports of the Argentine commandos' guerrilla war on South Georgia (6 May) and an already dead Pucará pilot's attack on HMS Hermes[12] (Lt. Daniel Antonio Jukic had been killed at Goose Green during a British air strike on 1 May). Most of the faked photos actually came from the tabloid press. One of the best remembered headlines was "Estamos ganando" ("We're winning") from the magazine Gente, that would later use variations of it.[126]

The Argentine troops on the Falkland Islands could read Gaceta Argentina—a newspaper intended to boost morale among the servicemen. Some of its untruths could easily be unveiled by the soldiers who recovered corpses.[127]

The Malvinas course united the Argentines in a patriotic atmosphere that protected the junta from critics, and even opponents of the military government supported Galtieri; Ernesto Sabato said: "Don't be mistaken, Europe; it is not a dictatorship who is fighting for the Malvinas, it is the whole Nation. Opponents of the military dictatorship, like me, are fighting to extirpate the last trace of colonialism."[128] The Madres de Plaza de Mayo were even exposed to death threats from ordinary people.[12]

HMS Invincible was repeatedly sunk in the Argentine press,[129] and on 30 April 1982 the Argentine magazine Tal Cual showed Prime Minister Thatcher with an eyepatch and the text: Pirate, witch and assassin. Guilty![130] Three British reporters sent to Argentina to cover the war from the Argentine perspective were jailed until the end of the war.[131]

United Kingdom[]

File:The Sun (Gotcha).png

The Sun's famous "Gotcha" headline

Seventeen newspaper reporters, two photographers, two radio reporters and three television reporters with five technicians sailed with the Task Force to the war. The Newspaper Publishers' Association selected them from among 160 applicants, excluding foreign media. The hasty selection resulted in the inclusion of two journalists among the war reporters who were interested only in Queen Elizabeth II's son Prince Andrew, who was serving in the conflict.[132] The Prince flew a helicopter on multiple missions, including anti-surface warfare, Exocet missile decoy and casualty evacuation.

Merchant vessels had the civilian Inmarsat uplink, which enabled written telex and voice report transmissions via satellite. SS Canberra had a facsimile machine that was used to upload 202 pictures from the South Atlantic over the course of the war. The Royal Navy leased bandwidth on the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications System for worldwide communications. Television demands a thousand times the data rate of telephone, but the Ministry of Defence was unsuccessful in convincing the U.S. to allocate more bandwidth.[133]

TV producers suspected that the enquiry was half-hearted; since the Vietnam War television pictures of casualties and traumatised soldiers were recognised as having negative propaganda value. However, the technology only allowed uploading a single frame per 20 minutes—and only if the military satellites were allocated 100% to television transmissions. Videotapes were shipped to Ascension Island, where a broadband satellite uplink was available, resulting in TV coverage being delayed by three weeks.[133]

The press was very dependent on the Royal Navy, and was censored on site. Many reporters in the UK knew more about the war than those with the Task Force.[133]

The Royal Navy expected Fleet Street to conduct a Second World War-style positive news campaign[134] but the majority of the British media, especially the BBC, reported the war in a neutral fashion.[135] These reporters referred to "the British troops" and "the Argentinian troops" instead of "our lads" and the "Argies".[136] The two main tabloid papers presented opposing viewpoints: The Daily Mirror was decidedly anti-war, whilst The Sun became well known for headlines such as "Stick It Up Your Junta!," which, along with the reporting in other tabloids,[137] led to accusations of xenophobia[129][137][138] and jingoism.[129] [138][139][140] The Sun was condemned for its "Gotcha" headline following the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano.[141][142][143]

Cultural impact[]

Main article: Cultural impact of the Falklands War

There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the UK and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present. The then elderly Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges described the war as "a fight between two bald men over a comb".[144] The words yomp and Exocet entered the British vernacular as a result of the war. The Falklands War also provided material for theatre, film and TV drama and influenced the output of musicians. In Argentina, the military government banned the broadcasting of music in the English language, giving way to the rise of local rock musicians.[145]

See also[]

  • Beagle conflict, a border dispute between Chile and Argentina that involved island territory.
  • Operation Algeciras, a failed Argentine plan to send Montoneros to sabotage British military facilities in Gibraltar
  • Operation Soberanía, plans for Argentina's invasion of Chile 1978 and later.
  • Reassertion of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (1833)


  1. 6 Pucaras, 4 T-34 Mentor and 1 Short Skyvan
  2. Template:Map-loc
  3. 21/27 May: 9 Dagger, 5 A-4C, 3 A-4Q, 3 A-4B & 2 Pucara
  4. Template:Map-loc
  5. Buenos Aires War Memorial is at coordinates 34°35′37″S 58°22′29″W / 34.59373°S 58.374782°W / -34.59373; -58.374782 (Buenos Aires War Memorial)
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  1. "Argentine to reaffirm Sovereignty Rights over The Falkland Islands". National Turk. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  2. "Cómo evitar que Londres convierta a las Malvinas en un Estado independiente". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  3. "Joint statement of 19 October 1989: Re-establishing Consular Relations Between Britain and Argentina, and Agreeing a Framework on Sovereignty Which Would Allow Further Talks". Archived from the original on 17 May 2012. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
  4. "Constitución Nacional". Argentine Senate (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 17 June 2004. La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional.
  5. White, Rowland (2006). Vulcan 607. London: Bantam Press. pp. 13–14. ISBN 978-0-593-05392-8. The price for Anaya's blessing was approval for the navy's plan to seize Las Malvinas, the Falkland Islands
  6. Bicheno 2006, p. 25: "A basic assumption underlying the conflict was that the British were, in the opinion of the war's main architect, Admiral Jorge Anaya, unworthy heirs to a glorious heritage, the men mainly maricones... to call a man a maricón does not question his heterosexuality; but it definitely impugns his physical and moral courage. Anaya was Naval Attaché in London from January 1975 to January 1976 ... He returned to Argentina, making no attempt to conceal his contempt for all things British."
  7. Middlebrook 1989, p. 1: "He was an ardent 'Malvinist' ... Anaya was enthusiastic, and his orders in the last days of 1981 were to set in train that tragic series of events."
  8. "Argentina – the horrors of a dictatorial past live on – Radio Netherlands Worldwide – English". 30 March 2006. Archived from the original on 16 March 2009. Retrieved 7 February 2010. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  9. Kirschbaum, Oscar; Van Der Kooy, Roger; Cardoso, Eduardo (1983). Malvinas, La Trama Secreta (in Spanish). Buenos Aires: Sudamericana/Planeta. ISBN 978-950-37-0006-8.[page needed]
  10. "Haig: "Malvinas fue mi Waterloo"". La Nación (in Spanish). 10 August 1997. Retrieved 25 October 2010. [¿Qué creía? Que tenía que ver con despertar el orgullo nacional y con otra cosa. … La junta – Galtieri me lo dijo – nunca creyó que los británicos darían pelea. Él creía que Occidente se había corrompido. Que los británicos no tenían Dios, que Estados Unidos se había corrompido… Nunca lo pude convencer de que ellos no sólo iban a pelear, que además iban a ganar.] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)" ("What do you believe? This was neither about national pride nor anything else. … The junta – Galtieri told me – never believed the British would respond. He thought the Western World was corrupt. That the British people had no God, that the U.S. was corrupt… I could never convince him that the British would not only fight back but also win [the war].
  11. "Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Tecnología de la Nación" (PDF). Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Jimmy Burns: The land that lost its heroes, 1987, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 0-7475-0002-9.
  13. "En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la posibilidad de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que los británicos pudieran reforzarlas". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  14. Briley, Harold (9 April 1997). "Obituary: Captain Nicholas Barker". The Independent. UK. p. 16. Retrieved 2 March 2011.
  15. Barnett, Correlli (1997). "The high cost of cuts". The Spectator. Archived from the original on 1 May 2013. Retrieved 7 February 2010. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 Margolis, Laurie (2 April 2007). "UK | How BBC man scooped invasion news". BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  17. Duncan, Andrew, The Falklands War, Marshall Cavendish Books Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7
  18. Margolis, Laurie (2 April 2007). "How BBC man scooped invasion news". BBC World Service.
  19. "No. 49194". The London Gazette (invalid |supp= (help)). 13 December 1982.
  20. 20.0 20.1 20.2 Lawrence Freedman (15 August 2007). The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War. Routledge. pp. 202–203. ISBN 978-0-415-41912-3. Retrieved 5 February 2012.
  21. 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 "A Chronology of events during the Falklands Conflict of 1982". Falkland Islands Information. Retrieved 24 December 2011.
  22. 22.0 22.1 Freedman 2005b, pp. 21–22: "day-to-day oversight was to be provided by ... which came to be known as the War Cabinet. This became the critical instrument of crisis management"
  23. Gold, Peter (2005). Gibraltar, British or Spanish?. Routledge. p. 39. ISBN 0-415-34795-5.
  24. Gold, Peter (2005). Gibraltar, British or Spanish?. Routledge. p. 37. ISBN 0-415-34795-5.
  25. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 32 p. 44, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982
  26. Borger, Julian (1 April 2012). "U.S. feared Falklands war would be 'close-run thing', documents reveal". The Guardian. London.
  27. Grimmett, Richard F. (1 June 1999). "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 24 February 2010.
  28. Caspar Weinberger, In the Arena: A Memoir of the Twentieth Century, with Gretchen Roberts (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001), 374.
  29. Paul Reynolds, "Obituary: Caspar Weinberger," BBC News, 28 March 2006.
  30. Graham Jenkins, "Reagan, Thatcher, and the Tilt," Automatic Ballpoint, 7 May 2010.
  31. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was to later write: "Without the Harriers ... using the latest version of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile supplied by Caspar Weinberger, we could not have retaken the Falklands." Dan Snow, Peter Snow, p. 270, 20th Century Battlefields, Random House, 2012
  32. "Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for '82 Falklands War". News and Analysis, U.S. Naval Institute. 27 June 2012. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
  33. John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". Archived from the original on 22 November 2010. As soon as the conflict began Hernou (French Defence Minister) got in touch with me to make available a Super-Etendard and Mirage aircraft so our Harrier pilots could train against them before setting off to the South Atlantic. (John Nott, defence minister during the Falklands war) Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  34. John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". Archived from the original on 22 November 2010. A remarkable world-wide operation then ensured to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina. I authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentineans. Other agents identified Exocet missiles in various markets and covertly rendered them inoperable, based on information from the French. (John Nott, defence minister during the Falklands war) Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  35. "The Peruvian Exocet connection in the Falklands/Malvinas war". Mercopress. 3 April 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2012.
  36. "El otro rol de Peru durante la guerra de Malvinas". Infobae (in Spanish). 1 April 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2012.
  37. Interview with Chilean Air Force Chief during the Falklands War Fernando Matthei Malvinas: "Hice todo lo posible para que Argentina perdiera la guerra" in Clarin, Buenos Aires on 1. September 2005. Retrieved 11 Jule 2011
  38. Freedman 2005b, pp. 397
  39. "The best trained units of the Argentine army, the 6th and 8th Mountain Brigades and the 11th Cold Weather Brigade were left behind to guard the frontier with Chile." Pradeep Barua, p. 152, The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States, BRILL, 2013
  40. Thomson, Mike (5 March 2012). "How France helped both sides in the Falklands War". BBC.
  41. Robin Yapp (20 April 2011). "Israel 'supplied arms to Argentina during Falklands War'". Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
  42. "'Begin aided Argentina during Falklands War to avenge the British'". Haaretz. 21 April 2011. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
  43. "Tras el pedido de perdón y en medio de elogios, Cristina regresó de Perú" in Argentine newspaper Clarín on 24 March 2010 Template:Es icon
  44. Land that Lost Its Heroes: How Argentina Lost the Falklands War, Jimmy Burns, p. 190, Bloomsbury Publishing, 11/04/2012
  45. van der Bijl, Nick (1999). Nine battles to Stanley. Leo Cooper. p. 141. ISBN 978-0850526196. The Junta were slow to admit defeat, but when the news was broadcast, Venezuela and Guatemala offered to send airborne units to 'smash the British in the Falklands'.
  46. Hernan Dobry in article Kadafi fue un amigo solidario de la dictadura durante Malvinas Archived 17 September 2011 at the Wayback Machine, in Argentine newspaper Perfil on 27 February 2011, in Spanish language
  47. "Brazil helped Soviet support operation for Argentina during the Falklands conflict". MercoPress. 23 April 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2012.
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  49. Woodward & Robinson 1997, p. 72 Cited in To Rule The Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World Herman, A (2004) Harper Collins, New York, p. 560.
  50. Lawrence Freedman (2005). "30". The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and diplomacy. 2. Psychology Press. pp. 431–444. ISBN 978-0-7146-5207-8. Retrieved 7 June 2015. During the course of May confidence that the naval threat was under control grew. Optimism on the air threat was much scarcer, especially among those who might be on the receiving end.
  51. "AV-8B Harrier Operations". Retrieved 21 April 2010.
  52. "Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War". Retrieved 4 January 2013.
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  55. Brown 1987, p. 110
  56. 56.0 56.1 "Submarine Operations during the Falklands War – U.S. Naval War College". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  57. "1982: Marines land in South Georgia". BBC. 25 April 1982. Retrieved 20 June 2005.
  58. Ward 2000, p. 186: "... to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel – equalled about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!"
  59. "Operation Black Buck". Royal Air Force. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  60. Freedman 2005b, pp. 296, 301, 631
  61. "Offensive Air Operations of the Falklands War". As a result of these heavy losses ... it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack.
  62. "The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense of the Fleet". Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense.
  63. "La familia Mirage". Aeroespacio (in Spanish). Fuerza Aerea Argentina. ISSN 0001-9127. Archived from the original on 31 May 2011. "Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas."
    ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")
  64. Ward 2000, pp. 247–48: "Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the Template:Sic Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires"
  65. "The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense of the Fleet". Unfortunately the British Secretary of State for Defence announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command, because it permitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield at Stanley.
  66. "Argentine Air Force remembers its "baptism of fire" twenty years on". 1 May 2002. Retrieved 9 June 2010.
  67. Rodríguez Mottino, Horacio (1984). La artillería argentina en Malvinas (in Spanish). Editorial Clio. p. 170. ISBN 978-9509377028.
  68. "Rodolfo Manuel de la Colina". Fuerza Aérea Argentina (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 12 March 2015. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  69. "Noticias Municipales | Puerto Madryn". 2 April 2009. Archived from the original on 15 April 2012. Retrieved 4 January 2013. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
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  71. "ASN Aircraft accident description Lockheed C-130H Hercules TC-63 – Pebble Island". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  72. Evans, Michael (27 November 2007). "Underwater and undercover: how nuclear subs were first line of Falklands defence". The Times. London.
  73. Woodward & Robinson 1997, p. 8
  74. Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher - The Authorized Biography: Volume 1, 2013 pp726-728
  75. "The SAS vs the Exocet". 27 October 2007. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  76. Evans, Michael; Hamilton, Alan (27 June 2005). "Thatcher in the dark on sinking of Belgrano". The Times.
  77. "British Special Air Service SAS - The Falklands - Operation Corporate". Retrieved 2 October 2014.
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  79. "Americas | Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note". BBC News. 15 March 1999. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
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  88. "Super Etendard". 29 May 2007. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
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  93. Rick Jolly, The Red & Green Life Machine, p. 124.
  94. "1982:Fifty die in Argentine air attack". BBC News. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  95. Bolia, Robert S. "The Falklands War:The Bluff Cove Disaster" (PDF). Military Review (November–December 2004): 71. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 March 2012. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  96. "An interview with CL (R) Ing. Julio Pérez, chief designer of Exocet trailer-based launcher" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 2 March 2008.
  97. Hastings & Jenkins 1984, p. 307
  98. "Ley 24.950: Decláranse "Héroes nacionales" a los combatientes argentinos fallecidos durante la guerra de Malvinas". InfoLEG (in Spanish). 18 March 1998. Retrieved 11 March 2015.
  99. "list". Archived from the original on 6 April 2010. Retrieved 7 February 2010. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
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  106. Force 4: The Newsletter of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, April 1983
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  109. "rest of army". 1 October 2004. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  110. Peter. "HMHS Uganda History". Retrieved 9 June 2010.
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  112. Davis, Ian (17 October 2014). "NATO's Ebola 'capability gap': where are the hospital ships?". NATO Watch. NATO. Retrieved 2 February 2017.
  113. "1983: Thatcher triumphs again". BBC News. 5 April 2005. Retrieved 8 June 2010.
  114. Rees, Alun. "Suicide of Falklands veterans". Daily Mail. London.
  115. Kapur, Navneet; While, David; Blatchley, Nick; Bray, Isabelle; Harrison, Kate (2009). Hotopf, Matthew (ed.). "Suicide after leaving the UK armed forces—a cohort study". PLoS Medicine. 6 (3): e26. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000026. PMC 2650723. PMID 19260757.
  116. "Edición Impresa | Una fecha trágica de nuestra historia". 4 January 2012. Retrieved 3 January 2013.
  117. A study of deaths among UK Armed Forces personnel deployed to the 1982 Falklands Campaign: 1982 to 2012 published: 14 May 2013
  118. Norton-Taylor, Richard (14 May 2013). "Falklands war: new study debunks claims of high suicide rates". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 12 July 2013.
  119. "Lady Thatcher marks Falklands anniversary at St Paul's". Archived from the original on 3 March 2008.
  120. "About the Chapel". The Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel website. Retrieved 12 June 2016. The Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel at Pangbourne College has been built to commemorate the lives and sacrifice of all those who died in the South Atlantic in 1982 – to stand as a permanent and ‘living’ memorial to remember them – and the courage of the thousands of Servicemen and women who served with them to protect the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands
  121. "Falklands (Las Malvinas) War Memorial Wall". Archived from the original on 16 July 2007. Retrieved 2007-07-16. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  122. Peter Snow, Dan Snow (16 July 2008). "1982 Falklands". 20th Century Battlefields. BBC. Retrieved 20 October 2011. After the war the British government offered to return the bodies of the Argentinian dead to Argentina for burial, but their government refused. They said that these islands were part of Argentina, and the bodies would remain here. For the Falkland islanders, these graves are daily reminder that Argentina refuses to drop its claim their homeland. Cite has empty unknown parameters: |serieslink=, |episodelink=, and |city= (help)
  123. "United Kingdom – Mine Action, Contamination and Impact". Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. 21 September 2011. Retrieved 16 June 2012.
  124. "Falklands' land mine clearance set to enter a new expanded phase in early 2012". MercoPress. Montevideo. 8 December 2011.
  125. "Falklands recover 370 hectares of Stanley Common made minefields in 1982 by Argentine forces". MercoPress. Montevideo. 17 May 2012. Retrieved 17 June 2012.
  126. El periodismo argentino y su papel en la Guerra de Malvinas Template:Es icon
  127. Middlebrook 1989, p. 94: "First of May. Menéndez ordered the publication of a newspaper for the troops on the Falkland Islands called Gaceta Argentina. It stated that one of the Mirages lost on 1 May had collided with a Sea Harrier and the Argentine pilot survived. In fact Argentine AAA at Stanley shot down the Mirage when it tried an emergency landing there. It was a blatant lie for all those Argentine servicemen who had seen the Mirage being shot down by Argentine guns and had removed the dead pilot from the crashed aeroplane. Similarly, the junta's press office in Buenos Aires informed that Lieutenant Antonio Jukic, who actually was killed in his Pucará on the ground at Goose Green, had perished in a gallant, single-handed Pucará attack on HMS Hermes, setting it on fire. This statement was illustrated with dramatic sketches. The men at Goose Green knew that Lieutenant Jukic had died on the ground there.
    Gaceta Argentina summed up the British losses up to 25 May as: 5 warship sunk (correct number 3), 3 transport ships including SS Canberra (1; Atlantic Conveyor), 14 Sea Harriers (2 shot down & 3 accidents) and many ships damaged, including HMS Hermes. Gaceta Argentina even wrote: 'All of these details refer only to proven claims and not to estimated or unproven claims ...'."
  128. "Template:Title missing". La Nación (in Spanish). May 1982. No se engañen en Europa. No es una dictadura la que lucha por Malvinas, es la Nación entera. Opositores a la dictadura militar, como yo, estamos luchando por extirpar el último resto de colonialismo.
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  130. "Margaret Thatcher portrayed as a pirate, 30 April 1982". Science and Society Picture Library. Retrieved 1 July 2011.
  131. Mather, Ian (1 April 2007). "I went as a reporter but ended up a prisoner of war". The Observer. London.
  132. Freedman, "two journalists on Invincible were interested in no issue other than what Prince Andrew, a helicopter pilot as well as the Queen's son, was up to".
  133. 133.0 133.1 133.2 Freedman 2005b, p. 36
  134. Harris 1983: "You must have been told you couldn't report bad news ... You were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."[page needed]
  135. Hastings & Jenkins 1984[page needed]
  136. "When Britain Went to War". Channel 4. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  137. 137.0 137.1 Dawn Fowler. "Margaret Thatcher And Falklands War Drama" (PDF). Retrieved 9 February 2011.[permanent dead link]
  138. 138.0 138.1 "A new Britain, a new kind of newspaper". The Guardian. London. 25 February 2002. Retrieved 9 February 2011.
  139. Stefanie Hauk. "Between censorship and rude sensationalism – Falkland and "the information war"" (PDF). Retrieved 9 February 2011.
  140. Kassimeris, George; Buckley, John D. (16 February 2010). The Ashgate research companion to modern warfare. p. 425. ISBN 978-0-7546-7410-8. Retrieved 9 February 2011. The Falklands conflict was no different, although the excessively jingoistic headlines of The Sun newspaper ('UP YOURS GALTIERI!', 'ARGIE BARGEY' and 'GOTCHA') resulted in a downturn in readership.
  141. "The Sun newspaper on the Falklands". The Guardian. London. 25 February 2002. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  142. Douglas, Torin (14 September 2004). "UK | Magazine | Forty years of The Sun". BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  143. "War". 4 May 1982. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  144. "Falkland Islands: Imperial pride". the Guardian. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  145. Por MATIAS QUEROL. "Malvinas, el curioso renacer del rock argentino". About. Retrieved 2 October 2014.


<templatestyles src="Refbegin/styles.css" />

  • Barnett, Anthony (1982). Iron Britannia: Why Parliament Waged Its Falklands War. Allison & Busby. ISBN 0-85031-493-3.
  • Bicheno, Hugh (2006). Razor's edge: the unofficial history of the Falklands War. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-84633-7.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Blakeway, Denys (1992). The Falklands War. Sidgwick & Jackson. ISBN 0-283-06101-4.
  • Brown, David (1987). The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Leo Cooper. ISBN 0-85052-059-2.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Dalyell, Tam (1982). One man's Falklands. Cecil Woolf. ISBN 0-900821-65-5.
  • Dalyell, Tam (1983). Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf. ISBN 0-900821-66-3.
  • Eddy, Paul; Gillman, Peter; Linklater, Magnus; Sunday Times of London Insight Team (1982). The Falklands War. Sphere Books. ISBN 0-7221-8282-1.
  • Femenia, Nora (1996). National identity in times of crises: The scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas War. Nova Science Publishers. ISBN 1-56072-196-0.
  • Finlan, Alastair. The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and Strategy (Psychology Press, 2004).
  • Fremont-Barnes, Gregory (2012). The Falklands 1982: Ground operations in the South Atlantic. 244. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84908-607-3.
  • Freedman, Lawrence (2005b). The official history of the Falklands Campaign. 2. Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5207-5.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Gavshon, Arthur; Rice, Desmond (1984). The sinking of the Belgrano. Secker & Warburg. ISBN 0-436-41332-9.
  • Harris, Robert (1983). GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis. Faber and Faber. ISBN 0-571-13052-6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Hastings, Max; Jenkins, Simon (1984). The battle for the Falklands. Norton. ISBN 0-393-30198-2.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Hobson, Chris; Noble, Andrew (2002). Munro, Bob (ed.). Falklands air war. North American trade distribution, Specialty Press Publishers & Wholesalers. ISBN 978-1-85780-126-2.
  • Kon, Daniel (1983). Los chicos de la guerra = The boys of the war. New English Library. ISBN 0-450-05611-2.
(English translation)
  • Middlebrook, Martin (1985). Operation Corporate: The story of the Falklands War, 1982. Viking. ISBN 0-670-80223-9.
  • Middlebrook, Martin (1989). The fight for the "Malvinas": The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War. Viking. ISBN 0-670-82106-3.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Norton-Taylor, Richard (1985). The Ponting affair. Cecil Woolf. ISBN 0-900821-73-6.
  • Ponting, Clive (1985). The right to know: The inside story of the Belgrano affair. Sphere. ISBN 0-7221-6944-2.
  • Prince, Stephen. "British command and control in the Falklands Campaign." Defense & Security Analysis 18.4 (2002): 333-349.
  • Tinker, David (1982). A message from the Falklands: The life and gallant death of David Tinker: From his letters and poems. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-006778-7.
  • Thornton, Richard C. (1998). The Falklands sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina's bomb. Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-155-8.
  • Underwood, Geoffrey (1983). Our Falklands war: The men of the task force tell their story. Maritime Books. ISBN 0-907771-08-4.
  • Ward, Nigel (2000). Sea harrier over the Falklands. Cassell. ISBN 978-0-304-35542-6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Woodward, Sandy; Robinson, Patrick (1997). One hundred days: The memoirs of the Falklands battle group commander. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-652-3.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)


  • Caviedes, César N (1994). "Conflict over the Falkland Islands: A never-ending story?". Latin American Research Review. 29 (2): 172–87.
  • Little, Walter. "The Falklands Affair: A Review of the Literature," Political Studies, (June 1984) 32#2 pp 296–310
  • Tulchin, Joseph S (1987). "The Malvinas War Of 1982: An Inevitable Conflict That Never Should Have Occurred". Latin American Research Review. 22 (3): 123–141.

External links[]

Template:Falklands War

Template:Falkland Islands topics Template:Margaret Thatcher Template:British colonial campaigns